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A hypothetical evolutionary scenario is oﬀered meant to account for the emergence of mental selves.
According to the scenario, mental selves are constructed to solve a source-attribution problem. They
emerge when internally generated mental contents (e.g., thoughts and goals) are treated like messages
arising from external personal sources. As a result, mental contents becomes attributed to the self as an
internal personal source. According to this view, subjectivity is construed outward-in, that is, ones own
mental self is derived from, and is secondary to, the mental selves perceived in others. The social con-
struction of subjectivity and selfhood relies on, and is maintained in, various discourses on subjectivity.
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This paper oﬀers an account of how mental selves may have emerged. It comes as a piece of
speculative psycho-history, that is, as a hypothetical evolutionary scenario. The core message is
that mental selves are sociocultural constructs rather than naturally given organs of human
minds. My argument will take three steps. First, I shall point out how the emergence of con-
scious awareness is linked to the emergence of selves. Then, I shall oﬀer an evolutionary
scenario that explains how, at some point far back in Stone Age, mental selves came into being
as a solution to a particular representational problem. Finally, I shall discuss mechanisms of
social interaction and discourse in the service of maintaining and preserving the institution of
mental selves.q I am grateful to Jonathan Harrow for translating the text from German into English; Heide John for completing
the manuscript.
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When we talk about stars and stones, when we are dealing with algae and fungi, or even grasses
and trees, we generally believe that everything that can be said about them at all can be said
through the means of physics, chemistry, and biology. This may also still hold for jellyﬁsh, worms,
and sponges, but then things soon start to become critical—if not with insects, then perhaps with
vertebrates, and certainly with mammals, particularly the primates, and inevitably, of course, with
Homo sapiens—with you and me. When considering these animals, we believe we cannot say
everything that can be said about them with these sciences. We also attribute them with an inner
life, perhaps to a lesser degree, but, in principle, similar and related to our own conscious ex-
perience. Some believe that when we impute subjectivity, we attribute to others what we know
from ourselves. Some others believe that we attribute subjectivity as a theoretical construct that
applies to others as well as to ourselves.
Subjectivity or consciousness—how should one approach this new quality that seems to have
emerged somewhere between ﬁsh and H. sapiens? How does subjectivity enter the world? What is
its function?
2.1. Descriptive accounts
What does conscious experience really mean? Let me start by stating what I do notmean when I
use this term. First, I do not mean those concepts of consciousness that take the rank of a special
substance, ontological form, or ontological level, as found, for example, in the German school of
idealism; instead, I use the concept and its verbal derivatives exclusively in the psychological sense,
that is, in the sense of concrete forms of mental experience. Second, I do not mean concepts of
consciousness that describe certain states of persons, for example, that someone is conscious or
has lost consciousness and is then unconscious. This notion of consciousness describes the dis-
position to produce conscious mental contents, and, insofar as theories exist on this, they specify
only the conditions under which this disposition comes and goes without telling us anything about
what is responsible for the conscious nature of their content.
This brings me to what I do mean and what I wish to explicate here: the conscious nature of
mental contents. Our being conscious is always expressed by our being aware of speciﬁc contents.
We cannot be conscious in a pure or empty form. It is always speciﬁc contents of which we are
aware, and it is only through our awareness of this contents that we recognize that we are con-
scious. Thus, like persons who can be in conscious or unconscious states, mental contents can be
conscious or nonconscious as well. Depending on our theoretical tastes, we then use such labels as
unconscious or preconscious mental contents, or those that are inaccessible to conscious experience.
How, then, is conscious experience possible, and what exactly is its conscious nature? When an-
swering this question, I shall follow a characterization given by Brentano (1924). Brentano uses an
extremely simple example to discuss the nature of what he calls mental acts. He raises the question
what actually happens when we hear a tone. What is responsible for the conscious nature of this
event? According to Brentano, there are two contents interwoven in this mental act: the tone that we
hear and the fact that we hear it. However, these twomental contents are not represented in the same
way. The tone is the primary object of hearing; we can observe it directly in the mental act. Hearing
itself is the secondary object of the mental act. Brentano says that it cannot be observed directly, but
W. Prinz / Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 515–528 517attains consciousness in another, indirect form: ‘‘We can observe the tones that we hear, but we
cannot observe the hearing of the tones. This is because it is only in the hearing of the tones that the
hearing itself is also assessed’’ (Brentano, 1924, p. 181; italics added).
This is as far as Brentano goes. However, if we want an exhaustive characterization of the
structure of mental acts, we have to go one step further: If it is true that hearing the tone contains
not only the tone itself but also, implicitly, its hearing, then the subject hearing it must also be
contained in the act in another encapsulation. This is because, just as a tone is hardly conceivable
without a hearing directed toward it, a hearing is hardly conceivable without a mental self or
subject who hears. Hence, conscious mental acts are characterized by what is sometimes termed
‘‘me-ness’’ (e.g., Kihlstrom, 1997), that is, the implicit presence of the mental self.1
2.2. Explanatory accounts
What sort of explanations do we need in order to ﬁnally say that we understand how the
conscious nature of mental contents arises? If it is true that the relationship of mental contents to
an implicitly present self forms the decisive foundation for the formation of their conscious na-
ture, then the problem of explanation shifts from consciousness to the self, that is, to the issue of
the constitution of the mental self and its implicit representation.
Therefore, we need theories that explain the role of the implicitly present mental self. An un-
derstanding of this role would simultaneously mean an understanding of how the conscious na-
ture of mental contents arises. Because the quality of conscious awareness does not just arise when
the condition of the implicit presence of the self is fulﬁlled but also consists precisely in this
condition being met, it becomes possible to understand not only—in correlational terms—under
which conditions conscious mental contents emerge but also—in foundational terms—why they
assume precisely this quality and not any other.21 In line with this, the conscious representation of a situation ends precisely when the self departs from it. If, e.g.,
while out walking, we become involved in a conversation that claims our entire attention, our conscious perception is
focused on the content of the conversation and the conversational situation itself. These are, to return to Brentano, the
primary objects on which the implicitly present self concentrates. It is only these that we perceive consciously. Other
features of the situation—namely, the scenery we are passing through—are not acknowledged. Naturally, there can be
no doubt that this information is processed, because, otherwise, it would be impossible to explain why we are completely
able to adjust our steps in line with the environment, even when we are deep in conversation. However, this processing
does not generate any conscious representation, representation related to the implicitly present self.
2 This distinction addresses one of the major problems faced by research into what some have termed the NCC—the
neural correlates of consciousness (e.g., Metzinger, 2000): Even if we had an exact and comprehensive account of the
neural correlates of consciousness, we would still be far from understanding why these neural processes bring forth
precisely this particular quality, and not some other. And, vice versa, we would be just as uncertain why certain neural
processes bring forth the quality of conscious awareness whereas others, in contrast, do not. Theories on the relation
between brain functions and consciousness oﬀer, at best, correlational relations that help us to know how the brain
subserves conscious experience, but not foundational relations that help us to understand those relationships. In this
sense the chase for the NCC appears to be pointless. The disparity between the phenomena we wish to relate to each
other here seems to be too large to permit us to trace them back to each other directly. Therefore, in order to gain a
better understanding of the foundational relations we are seeking, we need to insert a further intermediate level of
description between brain processes and conscious experience, at which the foundations of conscious experience are
speciﬁed at a representational level. This is exactly what this evolutionary scenario aims at.
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explaining a role? We need to explain what it performs on an ultimate level and how it achieves this
performance on a proximate level. Only when we have both—performances and mecha-
nisms—can we really understand the conscious nature of mental contents.
What, then, may mental selves be good for and why have they emerged during evolution (or,
perhaps, human evolution or even early human history)? Answers to these questions used to take
the form of stories explaining how the mental self came about and what advantages were asso-
ciated with it. In other words, these are theories that construct hypothetical scenarios oﬀering
plausible explanations for why certain (groups of) living things that initially do not possess a
mental self gain ﬁtness advantages when they develop such an entity—with the consequence that
they move from what we can call a self-less to a self-based or ‘‘self-morphic’’ state.
Modules for such scenarios have been presented occasionally in recent years by, for example,
Dennett (1990, 1992), Donald (2001), Edelman (1989), Jaynes (1976), Metzinger (1993, 2003), or
Mithen (1996). Despite all the diﬀerences in their approaches, they converge around a few in-
teresting points. First, they believe that the transition between the self-less and self-morphic state
occurred at some stage during the course of human history—and not before. Second, they em-
phasize the cognitive and dynamic advantages accompanying the formation of a mental self. And,
third, they also discuss the social and political conditions that promote or hinder the constitution
of this self-morphic state. In the scenario below, I want to show how these modules can be keyed
together to form a coherent construction.3. The emergence of selves: A stone-age tale
3.1. Two basic principles
As a starting point for the evolutionary scenario, let us consider a ﬁctitious, highly organized
living thing—on approximately the organizational level of a higher mammal. Although this an-
imal is equipped with highly developed cognitive abilities, it has one typical limitation: It is a
preverbal being in which symbolic communication and representation do not occur.
The cognitive ability of this ﬁctitious animal, but also the limits to its performance, can be
sketched roughly as follows: On the plus side, we can attribute it—put brieﬂy—with the ability to
evaluate the behaviorally relevant implications of each current stimulus situation and to trans-
form these evaluations into appropriate behavior. This evaluation functions on the basis of
complex algorithms that may belong, in part, to its genetically determined behavioral repertoire
but may also have arisen through learning processes. Further algorithms ensure that the outcomes
of these evaluations are compared with the animals current needs, and that this comparison is
transformed into action decisions.
Regardless of the potential complexity of the computations underlying behavior control, they
remain subject to the principal constraint of being coupled with each current situation. They
commence with the current stimulus information and evaluate action options that refer to the
current situation. In contrast, processes requiring explicit representation of circumstances that are
not currently present, such as representing past or planning future events, are not involved at all.
Our model animal is chained to the present.
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rated below: From these initially self-less beginnings, self-morphic modes of representation may
emerge, and can only emerge when two developmental stages follow each other in sequence. At
the ﬁrst stage, it is necessary to develop the ability to re-present circumstances that are not cur-
rently present and keep such re-presentation separate from perception.3 In the following, I shall
label this precondition dual representation. At the second stage, this has to be joined by repre-
sentation being interpreted as resulting from personal communication. I shall label this pre-
condition attribution to persons.
Dual representation concerns the natural history of behavior organization; attribution to per-
sons, in contrast, concerns the cultural history of our species. Although these two lines of de-
velopment can be distinguished systematically, they are linked together so closely in historical
terms that they can be presented only in relation to each other. I shall now describe this rela-
tionship for two distinct mental domains: ﬁrst, for cognition and, second, for action.
3.2. Application cognition: Thoughts and their sources
Dual representation. We shall now extend the abilities of our ﬁctitious animal through one
decisive step and assume that the social association in which it lives develops simple forms of
symbolic communication. What does this require? Let us examine, for example, the case of a
message referring to a circumstance beyond the current perceptual horizon of its recipient. To be
able to understand such a message, our animal must possess the ability of re-presentation, that is,
to form mental re-presentations of circumstances that cannot be perceived at the present time.
When doing this, it has to be able to discriminate between the contents of perception and re-
presentation, because it has to ensure that this re-presentation does not impede actions in the
current perceptual situation.
The formation of re-presentation therefore has two sides: On the one side, it permits a
representational decoupling from the current situation. On the other side, however, re-presenta-
tion cannot be allowed to replace perceptions; these have to be retained completely in order to
guide action. The simultaneous processing of re-presented contents alongside perceived contents
calls for a far-reaching extension of the cognitive processing architecture. What is needed now is
an architecture that discriminates between foreground and background processing and makes it
possible to process re-presented information in the foreground while simultaneously continuing
to process current perceptual information in the background—at least to an extent that maintains
the elementary functions such as movement control or orientation reactions in response to
unexpected stimuli.3 The term re-presentation stands for the German term Vergegenw€artigung that covers all kinds of representations
referring to circumstances that are not present at the current time. In the following, I shall distinguish between
re-presentations (in this restricted sense) and representations (in the general, broader sense). The term dual
representation refers to the requirement to keep re-presentation (of what is absent) and perception (of what is present)
separate from each other.—Importantly, the concept of re-presentation must not be confused with the notion of
re-representation recently suggested by Whiten, which refers to a speciﬁc way in which an individual interprets another
individuals actions (Whiten, 2000).
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what I label dual representation. I understand this as the ability to run perceived contents and re-
presented contents in juxtaposition but separated functionally. I do not wish to speculate about
how this architecture is implemented in the brain. The only important thing here is that it extends
the cognitive organization potential of the animal equipped with it in many ways. The most
important extension is probably the birth of the self as a consequence of attribution to persons.4
Attribution of thoughts to persons. Up to now, we have considered only re-presentation that is
triggered by the reception of verbal messages and, as such, is induced from the outside. Once an
architecture of dual representation has been formed, it also oﬀers space for the induction of re-
presentations from within such as thoughts, memories, or fantasies. For the sake of brevity, I shall
use the expression thoughts to stand for all forms of internally induced mental re-presentation.
Internally generated thoughts diﬀer from externally induced messages in one important aspect,
though: When re-presentation is triggered by external verbal messages, it is always accompanied
by the perception of an act of communication that itself occurs in the current perceptual situation.
In other words, there is always a person in the receivers environment, and this person is the
perceivable source of the message. Thoughts, in contrast, are internally generated acts of re-pre-
sentation that are not accompanied by the perception of a current act of communication—so that
they cannot be attributed to any external human source in the current situation.
Thus, where do thoughts come from? Who or what generates them, and how are they linked to
the current perceptual situation? This brings us to a problem that psychology describes as the
problem of source attribution (Heider, 1958).
One obvious suggestion is to transfer the schema for interpreting externally induced messages
to internally induced thoughts as well. Accordingly, thoughts are also traced back to human
sources and, likewise, to sources that are present in the current situation. Such sources can be
construed in completely diﬀerent ways. One solution is to trace the occurrence of thoughts back to
voices—the voices of gods, priests, kings, or ancestors, in other words, personal authorities that
are believed to have an invisible presence in the current situation. Another solution is to locate the
source of thoughts in an autonomous personal authority bound to the body of the actor: the self.
These two solutions to the attribution problem diﬀer in many ways: historically, politically, and
psychologically. In historical terms, the former must be markedly older than the latter. The4 The assumption that dual representation is a prerequisite for symbolic communication does not necessarily imply
that the ability to re-present only emerges when symbolic communication begins. One alternative course of
psychohistorical evolution could be that the ability to form re-presentations is much older, but initially restricted to the
systems ‘‘rest periods,’’ that is, to times when no online control of behavior is required. In such a scenario, the ability to
keep perception and re-presentation separate (¼ dual representation) would become indispensable only at the onset of
symbolic communication. Even more far-reaching is the idea that a completely developed dual representation
architecture already exists before the onset of symbolic communication. In this case, one would have to make other
factors that have nothing to do with communication responsible for the formation of this ability. As soon as symbolic
communication appears, the existing dual representation architecture can be used to interpret messages as external
communication acts, and, secondarily, it can also be used to interpret thoughts as internal communication acts arising
in the self. Hence, the common features that are critical for all conceivable variants of this scenario are: (a) the use of the
dual representation architecture to interpret acts of communication (perception of the communication act with
simultaneous re-presentation of the communicated content) and (b) the extension of this interpretation framework to
cover internally induced re-presentation.
W. Prinz / Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 515–528 521transition from one solution to the other and the mentalities associated with them are the subject
of Julian Jayness speculative theory of consciousness. He even considers that this transfer oc-
curred during historical times: between the Iliad and the Odyssey. In the Iliad, according to
Jaynes, the frame of mind of the protagonists is still structured in a way that does not perceive
thoughts, feelings, and intentions as products of a personal self, but as the dictates of supernatural
voices. Things have changed in the Odyssey: Odysseus possesses a self, and it is this self that thinks
and acts. Jaynes maintains that the modern consciousness of Odysseus could emerge only after the
self had taken over the position of the gods (Jaynes, 1976; see also Snell, 1975).
Moreover, it is obvious why the political implications of the two solutions diﬀer so greatly:
Societies whose members attribute their thoughts to the voices of mortal or immortal authorities
produce castes of priests or nobles that claim to be the natural authorities or their authentic
interpreters and use this to derive legitimization for their exercise of power. It is only when the self
takes the place of the gods that such castes become obsolete, and authoritarian constructions are
replaced by other political constructions that base the legitimacy for their actions on the majority
will of a large number of subjects who are perceived to be autonomous.
Finally, an important psychological diﬀerence is that the development of a self-concept estab-
lishes the precondition for individuals to become capable of perceiving themselves as persons with
a coherent biography. Once established, the self becomes involved in every re-presentation and
representation as an implicit personal source, and just as the same body is always present in every
perceptual situation, it is the same mental self that remains identical across time and place.
3.3. Application to action: Goals and their sources
We now move from cognition to action, and thus from cognitive to dynamic re-presentation.
What is the role of action plans and action goals in the process of forming a self? Their in-
volvement in this process leads to an extended self that functions not only as a representational
center for thoughts but also as a decision making center for actions.
To appreciate the importance of this development, let us return to our ﬁctitious animal that still
lacks dual representation. As we have seen, it controls its behavior through a continuous eval-
uation of incoming information with respect to its needs. As long as dual representation has not
formed, needs cannot be represented alongside the contents of perception, but only within them.
Perception is, so to speak, rendered dynamic by representing action incentives that conform to the
need within the current perceptual situation. In other words, the contents of perception are
equipped with attributes that specify their appropriateness in each case for satisfying current
needs. Foodstuﬀs are enticing; partners, attractive; rivals, oﬀensive; and ones predators, threat-
ening. The organism is exposed to forces that are inherent in the perceptual world, and the an-
imals behavior is the outcome of the interplay of these forces (e.g., Lorenz, 1937, 1943;
McDougall, 1908; Tinbergen, 1951).
Dual representation. However, the situation changes as soon as dual representation has formed.
The interplay of forces is now accompanied by the interplay of thoughts—and, with this, the
ability to form and maintain goals. The perception of current events is now joined by an inde-
pendent re-presentation of goals, that is, of potential future events that are desired and striven
toward. The ability to implement goals opens up completely new possibilities for controlling
actions in line with needs, because it detaches the re-presentation of goals completely from the
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settings independently from the current perceptual situation. Actions can then be selected and
conﬁgured so as to bring perceived actual states closer to explicitly re-presented desired states.
Attribution of goals to persons. When goals control actions, the question regarding where the
goals come from is no longer just an attribution problem that is of only psychological interest, but
becomes an issue of enormous political signiﬁcance. Naturally, an attribution problem will also
arise here only when action goals have been formed that are not given by other actors in acts of
communication. In the latter case, there is no need for any additional attribution, because the
person who is the source can be perceived in the current situation. The attribution problem will
arise only when goal re-presentations do not come from outside, but emerge within the system
itself.
In principle, the solutions are the same as before—but with the one diﬀerence that there is a
much stronger political interest in societys regulation of this attribution process: In the long run,
it concerns not just thoughts but real actions. One solution locates the source of action goals in the
will of invisible personal authorities, that is, in external authorities who, somehow or other, read
into the actor what he or she has to do and demand obedience by dint of their authority. The other
solution, in contrast, locates the source of action goals in the self. This constructs an internal
personal authority who reaches autonomous decisions on what he or she wants to do. Obedience is
replaced by autonomy.
Therefore, cultures that place the self in the position previously reserved for gods or kings will
bring forth autonomous agents—agents who understand their thoughts and actions, as it were,
proceeding outward from within. As a cognitive and dynamic center, the self is simultaneously the
source and the integration center for the persons psychological and physical activity.5 Of course,
this aristocratic role has its price: The mental self is now responsible for the thoughts and acts that
proceed from it and can also be made liable for them.
3.4. Summary
This completes our psychohistorical scenario. As can be seen, it makes a lot of demands on our
theoretical intuitions. First, it expects us to say goodbye to the idea that our selves are naturally
given organs of our minds that form the foundation on which the entirety of our experience is
based. Second, it expects us to believe that the self is nothing more than a speciﬁc mental content,
based on knowledge structures formed in learning processes and shaped in social interac-
tion—basically no diﬀerent from the mental representations of objects and events in the external
world (cf., e.g., Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994).6 Third, it expects us to acknowledge that subjectivity,5 Just like the cognitive self, the dynamic self is generally also present only implicitly in the psychological acts
concerned: A person who is planning acts or reaching action decisions is generally just as much ‘‘on the ball’’ as when he
or she is watching something or thinking about something. Whereas the mental self is not involved explicitly in these
acts, it is present implicitly. Then the ‘‘ball’’ that the planning person is ‘‘on’’ does not exist for its own sake, but as a
ball that is attended by the person him- or herself—and it is precisely in this sense that it is conscious.
6 The only feature through which the mental representation of the self stands out from mental representations of
events in the world is its meta-representational status: The self is represented as the source of other mental contents and
those contents are, in turn, always represented with reference to that source.
W. Prinz / Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 515–528 523or selfhood, is injected outward-in (rather than projected inward-out, as most theories submit),
that is, that it is ﬁrst perceived in external sources before it then becomes established as an internal
source as well.4. Discourses on subjectivity
The conclusion so far is that the self is an invention for solving an attribution problem. Initially,
it is set up as a source of internally induced re-presentation. Once this has occurred, its implicit
presence in mental acts forms both the functional and the foundational basis for the conscious
character of mental contents.
However, this invention should certainly not be viewed as a heroic achievement by single in-
dividuals. Rather, selves are construed and maintained in concrete social exchange—in discourses
on subjectivity and consciousness held within a culturally standardized interpretation framework
that controls the socialization of individuals and attributes them with a self-morphic organization
of their mental structures. I shall conclude by discussing three kinds of such subjectivity discourse:
discourses of attribution, reﬂection, and demarcation.
4.1. Attribution discourses
Consider ﬁrst attribution discourses in daily life. The most elementary communication mech-
anisms are based on direct face-to-face interactions in the microsocial ﬁeld and are not even nec-
essarily bound to a verbal communication. When all actors in a social grouping organize the way
they deal with each other on the basis of mutual attribution of self-morphic organization, each one
of them—and also every new actor who appears on the scene—is confronted with a situation in
which a self-morphic role is made available by the activities of others. In a situation like this, the
external attribution of this role may ﬁnally generate corresponding internal attributions in the
actor him/herself, and he/she will eventually adopt the attributed self-role as his or her own.7
More complex communication mechanisms are based on verbally bound attribution discourses
in themacrosocial ﬁeld. The ﬁrst one to mention is the discourse on psychological common sense, in
other words, the everyday psychological constructs that cultures or speech communities use to
explain the actions of their members.8 For instance, Western folk psychology operates on the basis
of a theory of human personality with an explicit self at its core that remains identical throughout
life and serves as the organizational nucleus for all cognitions and actions. Equally relevant are the
discourses of morality and law: They derive personal responsibility for individuals behavior from
viewing their selves as autonomous sources of action decisions. Such discourses focus far more on
the dynamic foundations of the self than its cognitive foundations—which is none too surprising in
light of their enormous signiﬁcance for the social control of action.7 The development of subjectivity and an understanding of subjectivity in early childhood has been studied in detail
over the last 20 years. See, e.g., Perner (1991), Rochat (1995, 1999), and Wellman (1990).
8 See, e.g., Heider (1958) and Prinz (1997). In recent years, the Cambridge philosopher Martin Kusch has developed
a theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of folk-psychology notions as social institutions, created and
maintained in permanent interaction and discourse (Kusch, 1997, 1999).
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Every day and every hour, major parts of our mental life are given over to our thoughts about
actions—about our own actions and those of others that we are explaining and evaluating. It is
also these considerations that determine a large part of our social exchange—an exchange that,
for many persons, consists in talking about who did what when and why, and how these actions
should be evaluated. And, last not least, we have been raised and we live in a vast world of ﬁc-
titious stories abounding with such issues—stories that we encounter in books, movies, and TV
programs with which we ﬁll out the times, in which we temporarily put aside the real stories we are
otherwise involved in.9 Moreover, it is also such stories that we tell our children in order to ex-
plain how thinking and doing relate to each other; and it is such stories that they absorb so avidly
in all cultures. What these oﬀer to them (and to us) takes two forms: ﬁrst, the explicit semantics
inherent to the particular culture—its morals and customs, its values and norms, and even its
myths and religious beliefs—and, second, and simultaneously, the implicit syntax of common-
sense psychology that speciﬁes how human actors function and, above all, how their actions relate
to their thoughts and desires. In this sense, folk psychology acts as a social institution that reg-
ulates our thoughts and actions (Kusch, 1997, 1999).
Although narrative may be the basic form of attribution discourse, this does not rule out the
existence of other forms. Moral discourse does not just tell stories but explains and evaluates
actions according to general rules. This is even more true for legal discourse that aims to sup-
plement narrative action explanations through reﬂective action evaluations.
4.2. Reﬂective discourses
In our cultural domain, the attribution discourses of daily life have long been supplemented
and extended through intellectual and scientiﬁc discourses that reﬂect on the role and status of
consciousness, and if we want to adopt a comprehensive perspective, we also have to view these
reﬂective discourses as elements of the broader cultural discourse that constitutes and maintains
subjectivity. Philosophy is particularly important here, and has always taken a leading role in this
discourse. For several hundred years, it has been dominated by one doctrine that could be
labeled—somewhat disparagingly—as a fundamentalism of consciousness (Prinz, 1996a). This was
formulated particularly succinctly in Descartes doctrine that only cogito, the self-experience of
the human mind, could be viewed as the one indubitable foundation of human knowledge.
Descartes believed that accessing ones own facts of consciousness is a process that is structured
much more simply than accessing the external world. When accessing ones own consciousness,
the mind is, so to speak, at home—instead of being confronted with material entities from the
outside world from which it fundamentally diﬀers. Accordingly, ﬁrst-person knowledge appears
to be infallible. Such knowledge, it is held, arises from immediate awareness of real facts—and
not from a process of representation for which the question of the relation between real and
represented facts could be posed in any meaningful way. Hence, phenomena of consciousness are9 Interestingly, the role of narrative is not just emphasized (and often also celebrated) in postmodernist approaches
in the social and cultural sciences, but has also long been the subject of a variety of diﬀerent philosophical approaches.
See, for example, Dennett (1992), L€ubbe (1960), and Schapp (1959).
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secondary and derived. This doctrine forms, so to speak, the analytically reﬂected, ideological
core of the modern discourse on subjectivity. It nurtures the idea that the mental self forms the
logical origin of all knowledge about the world—a theory that is naturally completely incom-
patible with the present scenario.10
4.3. Demarcation discourses
Finally, I would like to give a brief sketch of some demarcation discourses—discourses that are
partly attributive and partly reﬂective in nature and serve to ascertain the limits of subjectivity.
They diﬀerentiate between that which belongs to the domain of normally developed subjectivity
and that which lies beyond. For example, psychopathology has long known that attribution to
persons and self-constitution can take other than normal paths in the individual case—paths that
are viewed as pathological.
One example is the formation of delusional symptoms in psychotic disorders, particularly in
schizophrenia. According to the cognitive theories of schizophrenia developed in the last decade
(Daprati et al., 1997; Frith, 1992), these symptoms can be explained with the same basic pattern
that Julian Jaynes uses in his theory to characterize the mental organization of the protagonists in
the Iliad. Patients with delusions suﬀer from the fact that the standardized attribution schema that
localizes the sources of thoughts in the self is not available to them. Therefore, they need to
explain the origins of their thoughts, ideas, and desires in another way (see, e.g., Stephens &
Graham, 2000). They attribute them to person sources that are present but invisible—such as
relatives, physicians, famous persons, or extraterrestrials. Frequently, they also construct eﬀects
and mechanisms to explain how the thoughts proceeding from these sources are communicated,
by, for example, voices or pictures transmitted over rays or wires, and nowadays frequently also
over phones, radios, or computers.
Another example of self-constitution that does not comply with the norm is the multiple-
personality syndrome. The term multiple personality is used when two or more independent
personalities have formed within one person, and each lead their own lives. Even though some
particularly spectacular case reports have proved to be exaggerated and, in part, even fakes
(Confer & Ables, 1983), the occurrence of such split personalities is well-documented (e.g., Kluft,
1991; for historical records, see Greaves, 1993; Oesterreich, 1910). To some extent they form the
opposite pole of delusional symptoms: in the latter, the problem is a lack of self or self-attribution;
in the former, that several selves are available at the same time.
Further observations on disorders in the customary relation between actor and action are
known from split-brain patients and from healthy persons under posthypnotic suggestion. It has
been reported that patients who have undergone surgical division of the corpus callosum con-
necting the two brain hemispheres sometimes say or do things without being conscious of them,10 It should be noted in passing that this doctrine is now being questioned just as much as it has venerated. Recent
developmental studies have made a major contribution to these doubts. It has been shown that at no point in their
development do infants possess a better understanding of their own mental states than those of other persons. It often
seems as if even the opposite is true, and that self-understanding follows on fromanunderstanding of others—aﬁnding that
cannot be easily reconciledwith the doctrine of direct and privileged access to ones ownmental states (e.g., Gopnik, 1993).
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scious rationalization are each assigned to one of the two divided hemispheres (see, e.g., Gaz-
zaniga & Smylie, 1984; Zaidel, 1990). Similar observations are also reported regularly for the
performance of posthypnotic tasks: When participants carry out tasks that have been assigned
under hypnosis, they often provide attendant rationalizations for their (at times, highly comical)
actions. It seems as if the act precedes the desire here; as if patients and participants do not do
what they want, but rather (also) want what they (in any case) do or have done (see Prinz, 1996b).
As bizarre as these syndromes seem against the background of our standard concept of sub-
jectivity and personhood, they ﬁt perfectly with the theoretical idea that mental selves are not
naturally given but rather culturally constructed, and in fact set up in, attribution processes. The
unity and consistency of the self are not a natural necessity but a cultural norm, and when in-
dividuals are exposed to unusual developmental and life conditions, they may well develop de-
viant attribution patterns. Whether these deviations are due to disturbances in attribution to
persons or to disturbances in dual representation cannot be decided here. Both biological and
societal conditions are involved in the formation of the self, and when they take an unusual
course, the causes could lie in both domains.
I shall ﬁnish with a twofold train of thought: This addresses a favorite question to be found at
the center of the demarcation discourse—namely, whether and how far other living beings apart
from H. sapiens possess self-morphic mental organization and consciousness, and whether it is
also possible that there are human beings who do not possess this.
First, can a consciousness develop in animals if we attribute it to them? Would, for example, my
dog Max develop a self-morphic organization if he interact exclusively with human beings who
treated him like a conscious self? This notion conceals the question whether the social availability
of attribution to persons is suﬃcient for the formation of a self-morphic mental organization.
Following the psychohistorical sketch developed above, we have to answer this question nega-
tively—at least as long as we do not wish to assume that the second necessary precondition has also
formed in dogs: namely, the ability to maintain dual representations. Attribution to persons, as this
example shows, is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for the formation of consciousness.
Second, can human beings become unconscious zombies when denied all interactions and
discourses containing proposals for attribution to persons? For example, would it have been pos-
sible for the German foundling Kaspar Hauser to have been completely self-less and thus without
consciousness? Our theory has to answer this question aﬃrmatively, because it assumes that self-
morphic organization and consciousness cannot emerge without socially mediated attributions.
Thus, it seems as though it may well be possible for human beings to live without conscious-
ness, but not for animals to develop consciousness: Zombies may exist, but Bambi, Lassie, and
Fury will always remain a charming illusion.References
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